Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act prevent a¯rm from unilaterally increasing the wage it pays the union during the negotiation of a new wage contract. To understand this regulation, we study a counterfactual negotiation model where the¯rm can temporarily increase compensation to its employees during wage negotiations. Comparing this to the case where the¯rm does not have this option, we show that the¯rm may strategically increase the union's temporary wage to upset the union's incentive to strike, decreasing the union's bargaining power, and shrinking the set of permanent wage contracts that may arise in a perfect equilibrium. As the union becomes more patient, the best possible equilibrium contract to the union gets worse. In the limit, the uniqueness and hence the full e±ciency of the perfect equilibrium are restored. We also demonstrate that allowing the union to refuse the¯rm's temporary compensation does not a®ect the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Introduction
Created in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), also known as the Wagner Act, marked the federal government's¯rst comprehensive legislation supporting unionization and collective bargaining in the United States. Section 8(d) of the NLRA speci¯es that \the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment." The Supreme Court has interpreted this good faith provision of the NLRA as making unlawful for the management to alter any terms without the union's consent during the negotiation (see pages 188-189 of Leslie, 2000) . The Court's reason for this is not to allow a situation where the management could undermine the union's authority to negotiate and to represent the employees. In this vein, the Court even considers it unlawful for the management to temporarily increase the wages it pays labor while a new contract is being negotiated.
In this paper we examine the implications of this aspect of the NLRA that prevents ā rm from o®ering additional compensation to the union during a wage negotiation. Aside from undermining the union's authority, o®ering additional compensation has a strategic e®ect: additional compensation raises the union's opportunity cost of striking. How does the NLRA a®ect the players' bargaining behavior and the general e±ciency of equilibrium outcomes? To address these issues, we start with the contract negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) (also see Wen (1995), Houba (1997) , and Muthoo (1999) for the general negotiation model). In contrast to the standard bilateral bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) , the players' payo®s during disagreement are determined by a normal form game, called the disagreement game. This disagreement game captures the strategic relationship between the two players other than bargaining. For instance, in the contract negotiation model, the union may choose to either strike or work under the expired contract while bargaining over a new contract. It is quite common that workers continue to work under the expired contract, such as the recent negotiation between Verizon and its union. The negotiation model is also related to the money burning literature in non-cooperative bargaining; see Avery and Zemsky (1994) , Busch, Shi and Wen (1998), and Manzini (1999) . It has been shown that a negotiation game generally admits multiple perfect equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient outcomes with delayed agreements. In the contract negotiation model, in particular, the worst equilibrium contract for the union turns out to be the expired wage contract, which can be obtained if the union keeps working under the expired contract. In order to obtain the best equilibrium contract to the union, the union must adopt a non-stationary strategy, striking whenever the¯rm rejects its proposal, but working whenever it rejects the¯rm's proposal. In doing so, the union would be able to impose the highest possible cost to the¯rm when the¯rm rejects the union's o®er. At the same time, this striking strategy minimizes the cost the union would have to bear if it rejects the¯rm's o®er.
The contract negotiation model does not consider the possibility that the¯rm may choose to temporarily increase compensation to the union. In order to conduct this research project, we will compare two non-cooperative bargaining models. We¯rst study a bargaining model that generalizes the original contract negotiation model by allowing the¯rm to temporarily increase compensation before the union decides whether to strike during the current period of disagreement. Although both the union and the¯rm may strategically a®ect their disagreement payo®s, we demonstrate that this model cannot be analyzed under the framework of Busch and Wen (1995) . The non-normal form disagreement game typically imposes additional restrictions on the equilibrium strategy pro¯le. We¯nd that in some situations, thē rm does have an incentive to increase compensation to the union before reaching a new wage contract. By doing so, the¯rm would be able to lessen the union's incentive to strike, and hence prevent the non-stationary striking behavior the union needs to obtain its best equilibrium outcome. This model may still have multiple equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient outcomes. However, the¯rm's ability to temporarily raise compensation increases the e±ciency of perfect equilibrium outcomes in general.
The NLRA permits a temporary wage increase by the¯rm if the union approves; it is the unilateral wage increase that is deemed unlawful. In order to analyze the e®ects of the NLRA, we then study a second model where the union may refuse the¯rm's additional compensation.
We add the union's consent to the¯rm's compensation into our¯rst model. The¯rm may still o®er additional compensation to the union, but the additional compensation becomes e®ective only after the union's approval.
1 We show that, however, the union cannot credibly refuse the¯rm's additional compensation if the¯rm chooses to o®er in the best possible equilibrium to the union. Therefore, allowing the union's consent will not alter the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes. The strategic e®ect of increasing temporary wage remains valid even when we allow the union to block the¯rm's action.
In the next section we describe a non-cooperative bargaining model where the¯rm may unilaterally increase the union's compensation in any period.
In Section 3, we analyze perfect equilibrium outcomes, particularly the best and the worst equilibrium outcomes to the union.
We characterize how the union's best equilibrium can be drastically a®ected by the¯rm's ability to temporarily increase wage, upsetting the union's incentive to strike. We modify our model in Section 4 to allow the union to block the¯rm's o®er before choosing between striking and working in any period. We show that the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes is not a®ected by such a modi¯cation. Lastly, we summarize the paper and provide a few concluding remarks in Section 5.
A Model with Unilateral Compensation
Consider a situation where a union and a¯rm negotiate a new wage contract that speci¯es how to share the¯rm's future gross pro¯t, normalized to one per period over an in¯nite horizon. The expired wage contract is denoted as w 0 2 [0; 1]. The union must be paid at least w 0 per period if the union works during the contract negotiation.
The negotiation proceeds with alternating o®ers as in Rubinstein's (1982) 
the¯rm proposes the union proposes The model presented above has perfect information, so histories and strategies are de¯ned in the usual fashion. For example, a history consists of all past contract proposals and rejections, all past compensations o®ered by the¯rm, and all past decisions by the union on whether to work or to strike. A strategy assigns a feasible action to the acting party after each possible¯nite history. Every strategy pro¯le induces a unique probability distribution on the set of pure outcome paths. Denote a generic pure outcome path as
where d t 2 R 2 is the interim disagreement payo® vector in period t such that for 0 · t < T ,
if the union strikes in period t, (c; 1¡c) if the union works for c¸w 0 in period t, and a T 2 ¢ 1 (the unit simplex in R 2 ) represents the agreement reached in period T¸1.
An outcome with perpetual disagreement is represented by a in¯nite sequence of interim disagreement payo® vectors (or equivalently T = 1). From such a generic outcome path ¼, average discounted payo®s to the union and the¯rm are
where (± u ; ± f ) 2 (0; 1) 2 are the union's and¯rm's discount factors per bargaining period. In this paper, we will adopt the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame after any possible¯nite history. Hereafter, we simply refer to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium.
Our model generalizes the contract negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) by allowing the¯rm to o®er temporary compensation to the union. In other words, if the¯rm is restricted to o®er c = w 0 in every stage 3, then the model described here is equivalent to the contract negotiation model. Now we review some of the key results from the contract negotiation model. The following Proposition 1 asserts the lowest and the highest equilibrium contracts to the union in the contract negotiation model:
Proposition 1 In the contract negotiation model (i.e., where c = w 0 ), (i) the lowest equilibrium contract in any period is w 0 for all (± u ; ± f ) 2 (0; 1) 2 ;
(ii) the highest equilibrium contract in any odd period is
and the highest equilibrium contract in any even period is
Proof: See Lemmas 2 and 4 of Fernandez and Glazer (1991) .
This contract negotiation model has multiple equilibrium outcomes, including ine±cient ones, 4 if and only if (± u ; ± f ) 2 A for any given w 0 2 [0; 1]. Note that (± u ; ± f ) 2 A if and only
Condition (4) ensures the subgame perfection of a strategy pro¯le in which the union strikes in any odd period after the¯rm rejects the union's demand, but works in any even period after the union rejects the¯rm's o®er. The right side of (4) represents the union's highest possible continuation payo® if the union strikes in an odd period, while the left side of (4) represents the union's lowest possible continuation payo® if the union works in an odd period. More speci¯cally, if the union works then the union will be punished by the lowest equilibrium contract w 0 in the continuation game. If the union strikes then the union will be rewarded by the highest equilibrium contract 1 ¡ m f in the continuation game. Condition (4) ensures that the union will strike in an odd period to punish the¯rm for rejecting its o®er. Given the union's alternating strategies between work and strike, the¯rm's interim disagreement payo® is 0 when the¯rm responds to the union's demand, and the union's interim disagreement payo® is w 0 when the union responds to the¯rm's o®er. Equilibrium contracts, M u in an odd period and 1 ¡ m f in an even period, correspond to the stationary equilibrium outcomes with interim disagreement payo® w 0 to the union and 0 to the¯rm.
As a special case when the union and the¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0; 1), Proposition 1 simpli¯es to:
Corollary 1.1 If the¯rm is not allowed to o®er any additional compensation, and the union and the¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0; 1), then (i) the lowest equilibrium contract in any period is w 0 for all ± 2 (0; 1);
(ii) the highest equilibrium contracts in an odd and an even periods are, respectively,
In Appendix A, we demonstrate that the model described here cannot be analyzed by the general negotiation model of Busch and Wen (1995) , where the disagreement game is a static game given in normal form. The reason is that the disagreement game in our model, where the¯rm o®ers compensation and then the union decides to either work or strike,
is not a static game but a dynamic game. In Appendix A, we show that treating this dynamic disagreement game in its normal form does not alter the set of equilibrium payo®s characterized by Proposition 1. However, when we treat the disagreement in its original extensive form, we show in this paper that the highest equilibrium contract in an odd period is sometimes strictly less than M u . Subgame perfection imposes constraints on the additional subgames that begin during the dynamic disagreement game.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we investigate equilibrium outcomes in our model where the¯rm may unilaterally compensate the union during the contract negotiation. We will derive a range of equilibrium contracts. Our model has multiple equilibria whenever the contract negotiation model has multiple equilibria. Comparing with the contract negotiation model, we identify three sets of discount factors under which the¯rm behaves quite di®erently in the best equilibrium to the union. On one extreme when the union is su±ciently impatient relative to thē rm, the¯rm does not have to compensate the union since there is a unique equilibrium that leads to the lowest equilibrium contract. On the other extreme when the union is su±ciently patient relative to the¯rm, the¯rm has incentive to o®er additional compensation in order to induce the union to work in every odd period. The¯rm bene¯ts from compensating the union since the highest equilibrium contract is actually less than that if the¯rm does not compensate the union. When the union's discount factor is in an intermediate range, thē rm chooses not to compensate the union since it is too costly to induce the union to work in every period. It is worthwhile to notice the¯rm's di®erent behavior when there are multiple equilibria. Given the¯rm's discount factor, the highest equilibrium contract eventually falls with respect to the union's discount factor, a result that is quite counter-intuitive. As the union becomes su±ciently patient, any equilibrium contract will be arbitrarily close to the expired contract, which is also the lowest equilibrium contract.
The Lowest Equilibrium Contract
We begin the analysis of our model by establishing the existence of a simple equilibrium for all discount factors (± u ; ± f ) 2 (0; 1) 2 and all expired wage contracts w 0 2 [0; 1]. As in the contract negotiation model, w 0 is the lowest equilibrium contract for all possible discount factors.
Proposition 2 For all (± u ; ± f ) 2 (0; 1) 2 and w 0 2 [0; 1], there is an e±cient equilibrium where the union and the¯rm agree on w 0 in the¯rst period.
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 is supported by a simple and stationary strategy pro¯le, in which the union always demands w 0 and rejects any o®er that is lower than w 0 , the¯rm always o®ers w 0 and rejects any demand that is higher than w 0 , the¯rm never o®ers any additional compensation, and the union always works. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that neither the union nor the¯rm has any incentive to deviate from this prescribed strategy pro¯le. It is obvious that w 0 is also the lowest equilibrium contract since the union can choose to work and receive at least w 0 in every period during the course of contract negotiation.
Now we state this result as
Proposition 3 For all (± u ; ± f ) 2 (0; 1) 2 and w 0 2 [0; 1], the union never receives less than w 0 in any equilibrium.
The Highest Equilibirum Contract: Conditions
With the existence of an equilibrium, we now turn our attention to the highest equilibrium contract. Let M union's payo® from rejecting a¯rm's o®er cannot exceed (1 ¡ ± u )c 00 + ±M ¤ u . This implies that the union will accept any o®er that exceeds (1 ¡ ± u )c 00 + ±M ¤ u . Therefore in any equilibrium, the¯rm cannot receive less than (recall that the¯rm chooses c 00¸w0 )
in any even period by making an o®er su±ciently high (such as 1 ¡ m ¤ f ) to induce the union to accept while o®ering no additional compensation (c 00 = w 0 ) if the union rejects.
Next consider an odd period where the union proposes a contract demand. Recall that there are four stages in an odd period. In the last stage after the union rejects the¯rm's o®er and the¯rm o®ers c 0¸w0 , the union decides to strike or work during the current (odd) period. The¯rm is able to induce the union to work by o®ering a su±ciently high compensation c 0 such that
The left hand side of (6) represents the union's lowest possible continuation value if the union works under compensation c 0 , while the right hand side of (6) is the union's highest possible continuation value if the union strikes. Condition (6) states that the union has a higher payo® from working than from striking.
If the¯rm chooses to induce the union to work with c 0 that satis¯es condition (6), thē rm will receive at least
Alternatively, the¯rm may choose not to o®er any additional compensation to the union.
As in the contract negotiation model, the union may chooses to strike during the current odd period. Therefore, if the¯rm chooses not to o®er any additional compensation to the union, Proposition 1 applies and the¯rm's equilibrium payo®s are not less than 1 ¡ M u . To summarize, the¯rm chooses between these two alternatives and so the union's equilibrium payo®s in an odd period are not higher than
Note that in order to induce the union to work during the current (odd) period, the¯rm's compensation c 0 must satisfy condition (6). Now we state these arguments as In other words, conditions (5) and (7) (5) and (7).
Incentive to Compensate
Instead of solving M ¤ u and m ¤ f directly from (5) and (7) Proposition 3 states that w 0 is the lowest equilibrium contract. When (± u ; ± f ) 6 2 A, w 0 is also the unique equilibrium contract if the¯rm does not o®er any additional compensation. It is obvious then that when (± u ; ± f ) 6 2 A, the¯rm should not o®er any additional compensation to the union.
When (± u ; ± f ) 2 A, Proposition 1 asserts that
To obtain the M ¤ u and m ¤ f , condition (5) states that the¯rm should not o®er any additional compensation to the union and the union should work in every even period.
Suppose that the¯rm chooses to induce the union to work in an odd period with c 0w 0 that satis¯es condition (6), then the proposals that are consistent with the subgame perfection must satisfy the following equations:
Equation (9) states that the¯rm is indi®erent between accepting contract M 0 u and rejecting it (after which collecting 1 ¡ c 0 in the current odd period and m 0 f in the following even period). Equation (10) states the union is indi®erent between accepting contract 1 ¡ m 0 f and rejecting it (after which collecting w 0 in the current even period and M 0 u in the following odd period). Equations (9) and (10) yield
Note that M 0 u by (11) is increasing with respect to c 0 and is equal to M u at c 0 = 1. In the best possible equilibrium to the union, if the¯rm is able to induce the union to work in an odd period with c 0¸w0 , then M 0 u by (11) will be the highest equilibrium contract in an odd period. Comparing M 0 u in (11) and M u in (8) when (± u ; ± f ) 2 A, it is obvious that
This result is quite intuitive and important. Since it is always costly to the¯rm if the union strikes after¯rm's rejection, the¯rm bene¯ts if the¯rm can successfully induce the union to work in an odd period without compensating the union more than its gross pro¯t.
Otherwise, it is too costly for the¯rm to induce the union to work, and the¯rm is better o® by not compensating the union more than w 0 in an odd period. Proposition 5 asserts that the threshold where the¯rm is just indi®erent between o®ering additional compensation and not o®ering additional compensation, the necessary compensation needed to induce the union to work must be equal to 1.
Proposition 5 If the¯rm can de¯nitely induce the union to work with c 0 · 1 in an odd period, then the¯rm will do so in the union's best possible equilibrium.
From condition (6), the optimal (the lowest necessary) compensation needed to induce the union to work in an odd period is
At the threshold where the¯rm is indi®erent between compensating the union with c ¤ = 1
and not o®ering any compensation, the¯rm has the same (lowest) equilibrium payo® from the either alternative. Setting c ¤ = 1, equation (12) yields
The value of m ¤ f given by (13) is the critical value such that if the¯rm's lowest equilibrium payo® is higher than the right hand side of (13), the optimal compensation c ¤ will be less than 1, and so the¯rm will o®er c ¤ to the union. Otherwise, the¯rm will not o®er any additional compensation to the union. At such a threshold, the¯rm has the same (lowest) equilibrium payo® between the two alternatives: compensating and not compensating. This implies that
Solving ± f from (14) in terms of ± u and w 0 , we obtain
Dde¯ne the set B as
We will show that the¯rm will choose to induce the union to work in every odd period if and only if (± u ; ± f ) 2 B. The following lemma asserts that the fact of B ½ A for all w 0 2 [0; 1], as well as a few other properties of sets A and B:
Lemma 2 Given w 0 2 [0; 1], we have
(1; w 0 ) = 1, and
Part (iii) of Lemma 2 implies that A ½ B, as illustrated in the following Figure 2 : Figure 2 . Sets A and B of (± u ; ± f ).
Values of M
To solve the value of M ¤ u in terms of (± u ; ± f ) and w 0 , we¯rst compute the corresponding value f M ¤ u when the¯rm o®ers the optimal compensation c ¤ by (6), then compare f M ¤ u with M u to determine the value of M ¤ u . If the¯rm o®ers c ¤ in every odd period then the union will work in every odd period. 5 Substituting c 0 = c ¤ of (12) into (9), we obtain
Equations (5) and (17) yield the corresponding value of f M ¤ u when the¯rm o®ers c ¤ to the union and so the union works in every odd period, we have
5 For the sake of argument, the¯rm could o®er slightly higher than c ¤ so that the union strictly prefers working over striking.
Equation (18) gives the highest equilibrium contract when the¯rm o®ers the optimal compensation c ¤ to the union in every odd period.
From the construction, it is easy to see that on the boundary of set B where ± f = ± B f (± u ; w 0 ), the¯rm has the same interim disagreement payo® of zero from either compensating the union with its entire gross pro¯t in every odd period or not compensating the union at all so that the union will strike in every odd period. Recall that (18) gives the highest equilibrium contract when the¯rm provides just su±cient compensation to avoid the union's striking in every odd period. To summarize, we have
Proposition 6
Conditions (5) and (7) yield the union's highest equilibrium contract in an odd period as
As a special case when the union and the¯rm have a common discount factor ± 2 (0; 1), Proposition 6 simpli¯es to Corollary 6.1 When ± u = ± f = ± 2 (0; 1), we have
The highest possible equilibrium contract M ¤ u can be supported by an equilibrium for all (± u ; ± f ) 6 2 B in the same way as in the contract negotiation model. When (± u ; ± f ) 2 B, Compared with the contract negotiation model, our Proposition 6 implies that the¯rm bene¯ts from its ability to compensate when the union's and the¯rm's discount factors lie in set B. The lowest equilibrium contract is una®ected by the¯rm's ability to compensate.
This means that allowing the¯rm to compensate the union generally improves the e±ciency of equilibrium outcomes, but in a somewhat lopsided way. The¯rm's ability to compensate the union may limit the highest equilibrium contract to the union. This e®ect depends on the union's discount factor and¯rm's discount factor. Note that
It becomes so dramatic that as the union becomes more and more patient relative to thē rm, any equilibrium contract will be su±ciently close to the expired contract w 0 , which is the lowest equilibrium contract to the union.
Proposition 7 For any given ± f 2 (0; 1) and w
is increasing (to one as ± u goes to one), but M ¤ u is decreasing (to w 0 as ± u goes to one). Propositions 6 and 7 (also Figure 3) suggest, as the union becomes more and more patient, the highest equilibrium contract is decreasing, which is quite di®erent from the conventional result that patience is a virtue. The reason for this counter-intuitive result can be argued by one of our early results. As the union becomes more and more patient, the union needs less compensation to work in every odd period, which hurts the union in its best possible equilibrium outcome.
To conclude, we¯nd that the¯rm may bene¯t from compensating the union in odd periods when the union is relatively more patient than the¯rm, namely when their discount factors lie in set B. However, the¯rm will not carry out the compensation since the union and the¯rm would agree on a new wage contract immediately. When the union is not more patient relative to the¯rm, the¯rm could not bene¯t from compensating the union. In this situation, the¯rm either does not have to compensate (when (± u ; ± f ) 6 2 A), or does not want to compensate since the compensation needed to provide the union enough incentive to work is too high (when (± u ; ± f ) 2 AnB).
Compensation with the Union's Consent
As we have argued, the NLRA prohibits the¯rm from o®ering unilaterally additional compensation to the union during a contract negotiation. Such unilateral actions from the¯rm are considered to undermine the union's authority to represent the workers. In the previous section, we showed that under certain conditions, the¯rm has an incentive to o®er compensation to induce the union to work in every odd period in the reaching the highest possible equilibrium contract, so the¯rm's unilateral ability to compensate can also hurt the workers economically. The NLRA does not completely prohibit the¯rm from compensating the workers, but rather provides power to the union to block the¯rm's action. Now we examine whether it is credible for the union to block¯rm's compensation if thē rm chooses to compensate in the best possible equilibrium to the union. Our answer is
negative. In order to analyze this issue more formally, we modify our model studied in the previous section so that the union needs to decide whether to approve the¯rm's compensation before deciding whether to strike or to work in any period after disagreement.
6
The negotiation proceeds in the fashion of alternating-o®er as in the previous model.
There is one more stage where the union decides whether to approve the¯rm's compensation o®er. More speci¯cally, in any odd period before reaching an agreement, the union proposes Despite the union's ability to block the¯rm's compensation, w 0 is still the lowest equilibrium contract. In the rest of this section, we show that the union cannot credibly block the¯rm's additional compensation when the¯rm o®ers in the best possible equilibrium to the union. When (± u ; ± f ) 6 2 B, we know that the¯rm either does not have to or does not want to compensate the union. It will continue to be the case when the union can block thē rm's additional compensation. Suppose that the union always approves the compensation o®ered by the¯rm. Then this modi¯ed model is virtually the same as our original model. Restricting c 0¸w0 implies that the union never disapprove (D) the¯rm's compensation and then works for the current odd period, which is quite intuitive. It is not hard to see from Figure 4 that when condition (6) holds, it is not credible for the union to disapprove (D) c 0 and then to strike (S). In addition, any equilibrium outcome in our original model can also be supported in the current model by duplicating the continuation equilibrium in the subgames after the union approves or disapproves the¯rm's compensation.
Proposition 8 Allowing the union to block the¯rm's additional compensation will not change the set of equilibrium payo®s.
Proposition 8 implies that suppressing the union's ability to block the¯rm's compensation makes no di®erence, the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 are still valid. In particular,
we have found that the¯rm can still upset the union's incentive to strike when (± u ; ± f ) 2 B even if the union can block the¯rm's action.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that a¯rm may have an incentive to increase workers' temporary wages during a contract negotiation. This could happen even when the¯rm needs to pay the workers almost all of its gross pro¯t. Higher wages (either expired or temporary) will lower then the union's incentive to strike. It is well known by now that the type of negotiation model we adopted in this study admits multiple equilibrium outcomes. We address the issues we concern by studying the range of wages that may arise in equilibrium. 6 Appendix A
In this appendix, we argue that treating the dynamic disagreement game in its normal form does not alter the set of equilibrium payo®s characterized by Proposition 1. Consider the normal form representation of the disagreement, where the¯rm's and union's strategy spaces and payo® functions are Note that the union's decision to work or strike depends on the¯rm's compensation o®er.
According to Busch and Wen (1995) , in order to support the highest equilibrium contract, we need to¯nd the¯rm's lowest disagreement payo® and the union's highest disagreement payo® supportable in an equilibrium. The¯rm's lowest supportable disagreement payo® is the¯rm's minimax value 0 in the disagreement game, achieved when the union strikes. The union's highest supportable disagreement payo® is the highest di®erence between the union's disagreement payo® and the¯rm's gain from deviating:
achieved when the union works even if the¯rm does not o®er any additional compensation.
This implies that Proposition 1 would continue to hold if one treated the normal form representation of the underlying game as the disagreement game. Therefore, allowing the¯rm to o®er additional compensation would not change the results from the contract negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) .
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the following strategy pro¯le: In any odd period, the union demands w 0 and the¯rm accepts demands of no more than w 0 . In any even period, the¯rm o®ers w 0 and the union accepts o®ers of no less than w 0 . The¯rm does not o®er any additional compensation and the union chooses to work in any period. In what follows, we show that this strategy pro¯le constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Since the continuation payo®s are independent of the history in any stage of any period, it is optimal for the union to work for any compensation. Given that, the¯rm should not o®er any additional compensation. In any odd period, the¯rm receives 1¡ w 0 after rejecting the union's demand so the¯rm will reject any wage demand higher than w 0 . In any even period, the union's payo® from rejecting the¯rm's o®er is w 0 so it is optimal to the union to reject any wage o®er that is less than w 0 . In summary, neither the union nor the¯rm has any incentive to deviate from the strategy pro¯le described above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The proof is divided into four parts. 
which is trivial for all permissible values of ± u and w 0 .
(iv) This part of the proof is straightforward. For example
At ± u = 1, this derivative equals 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: From condition (7), we have that M
